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The New Fiscal Regime proposal put forward by 
the Temer administration proposes a rule for pri-
mary Federal Government expenditures for the 
next 20 years, alterable – restricted to the cor-
rection factor – in 10 years. This proposal was 
approved as Constitutional Amendment Propo-
sition 241/2016 (PEC 241) in the House of Rep-
resentatives and is now under appreciation in 
the Brazilian Senate as PEC 55. Under its rules, 
federal expenditures, minus interest payments 
on the public debt, will be limited to the previous 
year’s expenditures adjusted by the accumulated 
inflation, measured by the Extended National 
Consumer Price Index (IPCA). In short, the New 
Fiscal Regime will lead to an actual federal gov-
ernment budget freeze, which presupposes a re-
duction in public expenditures relative to Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and to the number of 
inhabitants. That is, according to the proposed 
rule, public expenditures will not follow the 
growth in income and population.
In this short article, we will address two as-
pects of this proposal. The first is its macroeco-
nomic impact, taking into account the fact that 
the new fiscal regime presupposes a scenario of 
fiscal austerity over the next 20 years. The second 
is its impact on federal education and health 
spending. We will show that (i) the proposal will 
not lead to economic growth and (ii) will subs-
tantially reduce health and education spending.
Twenty years of austerity
Historical experience shows, as discussed by 
Blyth 1, that the austerity remedy aggravates the 
problems it seeks to solve. Government expen-
ditures are private sector income, which means 
that, when the government stops spending, 
someone stops earning. Likewise, the public 
surplus is private deficit and public debt is pri-
vate sector asset. Thus, amidst a recession, char-
acterized by a retraction in private spending, if 
the government seeks to avoid public deficit by 
cutting its expenditures, it may simply worsen 
its patrimonial situation and that of the private 
market, that is, the fiscal effort would cut private 
sector revenues even further.
In the vicious circle of austerity, public expen-
diture cuts induce growth reduction, which leads 
to new reductions in revenues, which demands 
new spending cuts. This vicious circle only ten-
ds to be broken through deliberate government 
decisions, unless there is a sufficient increase in 
exports to compensate the cumulative causation 
of the retraction in public and private internal 
demand. This exception is less likely amidst an 
international crisis such as the one currently 
under way, with slow recovery of demand, gre-
ater competition for markets and with foreign 
trade growing less than the already-depressed 
world GDP.
In Brazil, the austerity turn is a mark of the se-
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the adoption of her 2014 presidential election 
opponent’s economic strategy – that is, a harsh 
fiscal and monetary adjustment in the hopes 
that the private sector would regain confidence 
and begin to invest again. The idea was that the 
fiscal contraction would be expansionist, only 
going through a short recessive period that was 
needed in order to recover trust in government 
policies. However, despite all the government’s 
efforts in reducing expenditures, which in 2015 
led to an actual 2.9% real reduction in prima-
ry federal spending, revenues plummeted and 
the deficit grew even larger, rendering clear the 
adjustment’s counterproductive nature: auste-
ricide. That is, spending cuts amidst a scenario 
such as what was present in 2015 is no guaran-
tee of better fiscal indicators, on the contrary, the 
public budget worsened due to the interruption 
in public investments and cutbacks to important 
areas such as health and education.
In spite of this experience, the Temer 
administration’s New Fiscal Regime proposal 
insists on the austerity remedy. The proposal’s 
basic principle is that the federal public spending 
have null real growth, which will lead to a reduc-
tion in public spending as a proportion of GDP. 
This principle may be identified as a continuous 
austerity effort which seeks to systematically 
reduce the State’s participation in the economy 
and, therefore, in economic growth. That is, pu-
blic demand will systematically contribute to 
reducing economic growth, which will demand 
a much greater effort from the private compo-
nents of demand (consumption, investment and 
foreign demand).
Additionally, unlike the international expe-
rience, the New Fiscal Regime has no escape 
clause, that is, it does not permit the rules to be 
eased during extraordinary economic crises, su-
ch as the 2009 crisis, a year in which most central 
countries expanded public spending, incurring 
enormous fiscal deficits.
That is, from the macroeconomic point of 
view, the fiscal reform is disastrous because it 
imposes a contractionist character on the public 
demand over a long period and because it takes 
away from the State the fiscal instruments it ne-
eds to face economic crises. However, its social 
effects are even more critical.
New Fiscal Regime target’s health  
and education
As the International Monetary Fund’s text shows, 
no country in the world has established a rule for 
public spending like the one currently being dis-
cussed in Brazil, through a constitutional amend-
ment 2. In the Brazilian case, there was also no 
need to write the fiscal rule into the constitution, 
however, in order to make it viable, constitu-
tional changes are needed. For PEC 55, the only 
relevant measure, in terms of the constitution, is 
removing the mandatory health and education 
spending. That is to say, the New Fiscal Regime 
does not require a constitutional amendment, 
what requires a constitutional change is the 
mandatory spending on health and education. 
Thus, the new fiscal regime PEC is, in fact, the 
removal of mandatory health and education 
spending PEC.
In Brazil, the minimum mandatory spending 
on education, established by article 212 of the 
Federal Constitution, is 18% of the Net Tax Re-
venue (RLI, in Portuguese). The minimum he-
alth spending was recently altered through the 
Constitutional Amendment 86, which establishes 
an increasing percentage of the Net Current Re-
venue (RCL, in Portuguese), 13.2% of the RCL in 
2016, 13.7% in 2017, 14.2% in 2018, 14.7% in 2019 
and 15% starting in 2020.
PEC 55, on the other hand, establishes that, 
in 2017, education spending will be 18% of the 
RLI, health spending will be 15% of the RCL and, 
from then onwards, both will be limited to 2017 
spending levels adjusted for inflation. That is, the 
real minimum federal spending on health and 
education will be frozen at 2017 levels.
Comparing current rules with the minimum 
established by the PEC, we see that what the PEC 
establishes is, in fact, a sliding minimum (Figu-
re 1). That is, over time, the minimum value for 
health and education will fall as a proportion of 
revenue and GDP. In the simulation we present 
in Figure 1, with PEC 55, the minimum education 
spending would be 14.4% of the RLI in 2026 and 
11.3% in 2036, while the minimum health spen-
ding would be 12% of the RCL in 2026 and 9.4% in 
2036. It is worth noting that, despite the fact that 
PEC 55 establishes a higher minimum for health 
spending in 2017 and 2018, the government has 
been spending more than 15% of net revenue on 
health since 2014.
However, despite the “sliding minimum”, the-
re is a possibility of increasing health and edu-
cation spending over the minimum through a 
reduction in other expenditures. But that possi-
bility is limited by the reduction in total expendi-
tures and by the increase in other expenditures. 
That is, by establishing a limit that reduces public 
spending as a proportion of the GDP, there is a 
compression of social spending.
The document Austerity and Setbacks: Public 
Finances and Fiscal Policy in Brazil 3 presents a 
projection of federal public expenditures under 
PEC 241 (Figure 2). The federal government’s 
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Figure 1
Minimum health and education spending under current rules and under PEC 55 *.
Source: elaborated by the authors. 
* The simulation is based on the hypothesis that GDP grows 2.5% per year during the period and that net income follows 
GDP growth.
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Figure 2
Simulation of public expenditures under the New Fiscal Regime, 2015-2036.
Source: document Austerity and Setbacks: Public Finances and Fiscal Policy in Brazil 3. 
* The simulation considers a highly optimistic scenario – though still inferior to the average GDP growth of the past 20 years, 
which is close to 3% – of 2.5% growth in the economy per year starting in 2018. Additionally, the simulation considers  
a conservative evolution for expenditures with social security benefits
total primary expenditures would go from 19.6% 
of the GDP in 2015 to 15.8% in 2026 and 12% 
in 2036. 
Additionally, social security spending, whi-
ch currently correspond to around 8% of GDP, 
should increase due to demographics, even 
if undergoes a reform. In that context, there is 
no room for maintaining health and education 
spending as a proportion of the GDP, and they 
will tend to decrease under the new rule.
In this simulation, with the health and educa-
tion spending freeze, they will go from 4% of GDP 
in 2015 to 2.7% of GDP in 20 years, when the Bra-
zilian population will be 10% larger. Meanwhile, 
other federal expenditures (excluding social se-
curity and interest payments) which made up 7% 
of GDP in 2015 will be 0.6% of GDP in 2036, which 
seems neither technically nor politically feasible.
Considering an unlikely stabilization of social 
security spending at 8.5% of GDP and an average 
2.5% economic growth, simple arithmetics show 
that it is impossible – mathematically impossible 
– for Brazil to reach 2036 with a higher level of 
health and education spending, as a proportion 
of GDP, even under the anarcho-capitalist hy-
pothesis of eliminating all other public expen-
ditures, executive, judiciary, legislative, armed 
forces, infrastructure, etc. That is because, ac-
cording to the simulation, total primary govern-
ment spending in 2036 will be 12.3% of GDP. If 
social security spending adds up to 8.5% of GDP, 
there will only be 3.8% of the GDP left, an infe-
rior percentage to current health and education 
spending, around 4% of GDP in 2016. Thus, it is 
demagogic to simultaneously defend the PEC 
and public health and education.
Final considerations
In summary, the government’s proposed fiscal 
reform is not a plan for fiscal stabilization, but a 
project of drastic State reduction. In the macro-
economic plane, the reform will hinder econom-
ic growth by institutionalizing and automatizing 
a permanent fiscal adjustment. Additionally, 
the reform will have profound social impacts. 
Its logic presupposes zero federal public spend-
ing growth while both population and income 
grow, which means reducing the per capita pub-
lic spending and the spending as a proportion of 
the GDP. Additionally, while some expenditures 
will necessarily have a real increase, such as so-
cial security spending, others will be reduced un-
der pressure from PEC limits, so as to reconfigure 
the Brazilian State. Finally, we argue that the only 
reason this fiscal reform is being discussed as a 
constitutional amendment is to remove manda-
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tory minimum spending on health and educa-
tion. Thus, PEC 55 renders any improvement in 
public health and education in Brazil impossible, 
on the contrary, it creates an opportunity for the 
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